2021年8月15日星期日

乔治·索罗斯 | 习近平的独裁威胁中国这个国家

本文是索罗斯(George Soros)先生又来批评习近平了,上次(2019年1月24日)索罗斯在达沃斯经济论坛公开指《
中国习近平是开放社会最危险的敌人
https://blog.bullog.org/2019/01/sorosspeech.html ,这次索罗斯为《华尔街日报》撰写的评论 《习近平的独裁威胁中国这个国家》 的中文版,由开放社会基金会(Open Society Foundations)翻译,中国数字时代获授权发表。本网站没有获得授权,但仍然决定复制中文和英文原文在此,供大家阅读。

中文版:

中国的统治者习近平,正饱受若干内部矛盾的困扰,这大大降低了他的领导凝聚力和有效性。

习的信念和行为之间存在矛盾,正如他对公众声称想让中国成为超级大国,和他作为国内统治者的行为之间的冲突。这些内部矛盾,是在美中冲突日益加剧的背景下暴露出来的。

这场冲突的核心,是两个国家所代表的截然相反的治理体系这一现实。 美国代表民主的开放社会,政府的作用是保护个人自由。 习近平认为,毛泽东发明了一种优越的组织形式,他正在加以继承,即一个个人服从于一党制国家的极权封闭社会。 从这个角度来看,它是优越的,因为它更有纪律性、更强大,因而将在竞争中获胜。

中美关系正在迅速恶化,并可能导致战争。 习近平明确表示,他打算在未来十年内占领台湾,并正在相应地加强中国的军事实力。

他在国内面临着2022年的一个障碍,届时他打算打破既定的继任制度,终身担任国家主席。 他感觉至少还需要十年,才能将一党制国家及军队的权力完全集中在自己手中。 他知道这一计划会有很多人反对,要确保他的敌人没有能力阻止他。

当前金融市场的动荡,正是在这种背景下发生的,出乎很多人意料,让他们不知所措,混乱加剧了动荡。

虽然我不再从事金融市场业务,但我曾经是一个活跃的参与者。 自1984年以来,我也一直积极参与中国事务。当时我将中国共产党的改革者,介绍给我母国匈牙利的同行。 他们互相学习了很多东西,我随后在这两个国家设立了基金会。那也是我称谓的政治慈善事业的开始。我在中国的基金会获得了近乎完全的独立,这是独一无二的。1989年,在天安门广场屠杀之前,当我得知它已被中国政府控制后,就将其关闭了。当习近平成为统治者时,2013年,我恢复了在中国的积极参与,但这一次是作为一个直言不讳的反对者,反对至今已成为极权主义的政权。

我认为习近平是世界上开放社会最危险的敌人。整个中国人民都是他的受害者,但国内的政敌、宗教、和少数民族遭受的迫害更多的多。尤其令我不安的是,那么多中国人似乎对社会信用监控系统不仅可以忍受,而且认为很有吸引力。它免费为他们提供社会服务,并告戒他们,如何通过不发表任何批评习近平或其政权的言论,避免陷入困境。 如果习能够完善社会信用体系,并确保大众生活水平稳步提高,他的政权就会更加稳固。 但在这两方面,他肯定都会有麻烦。

要理解其中的原因,需要一些历史背景。习近平于2013年成为国家主席,他是其前任邓小平大胆改革议程的受益者,邓小平对中国在世界上的地位有着截然不同的概念。邓意识到西方要发达得多,有很多值得中国学习的地方。邓希望中国在西方主导的全球体系之中崛起,而不是截然与之对立。邓的方法奇迹般地奏效。中国于2001年被接纳为世界贸易组织成员,享有欠发达国家地位带来的优惠。中国进入了前所未有的增长期,它甚至比发达国家更好地应对了 2007-08 年的全球金融危机。

习近平不理解邓小平是如何取得成功的。他把邓的成功认为是理所当然并加以利用,而他对邓怀有强烈的个人怨恨。 他认为邓小平对其父亲习仲勋的遭遇负有责任,其父亲于1962年被从政治局撤职。习近平因此在非常困难的农村环境中成长,他没有受到应有的教育,没有出国,也从没学过一门外语。

习近平极力消除邓小平对中国发展的影响。 他个人对邓的敌意在其中起了很大的作用,但其他因素也同样重要。他有强烈的民族主义倾向,希望中国成为世界的主导力量。他也深信,中国共产党必须是一个列宁主义的政党,要用政治和军事力量来强加自己的意志。习近平强烈认为,为确保中国共产党足够强大,这是必要的,为实现他的目标需要必要的牺牲。

习近平意识到,为完成其人生使命,他必须维持无可争议的统治地位。他不懂金融市场是如何运作的,但他很清楚自己在2022年必须做什么才能继续掌权。他打算超越邓小平规定的任期限制,这一限制保证了习近平的两位前任胡锦涛和江泽民的继任。 由于许多政界和商界精英可能会反对习近平,他必须阻止他们联合起来反对他。因此,他的首要任务,是使任何富有到能够独立行使权力的人屈从于他。

这一进程在过去一年中一直在展开,并在最近几周达到高潮。它始于2020年11月,阿里巴巴的蚂蚁集团被突然取消新股发行,其前执行主席马云暂时销声匿迹;随后于2021年6月,对在纽约上市的滴滴出行采取了纪律处分措施;最终三家美国投资的补习公司被封杀。这对国际市场的影响比习近平预期的要大得多。中国金融当局试图安抚市场,但收效甚微。

习近平正在进行一场系统的运动,清除积累了大量财富的人或抵消其影响。他最新的受害者是孙大午,一位与政治保持距离的亿万富翁养猪户,孙先生已被说服,将其大部分财富“捐赠”给慈善机构。

这场运动在威胁着要摧毁下金蛋的鹅。习近平决心将财富的创造者置于一党制国家的控制之下。他将双重管理结构重新引入大型民营企业,这一做法在邓小平改革时期已基本放弃。现在民营和国有企业,不仅由他们的管理层经营,还有一个级别高于公司总裁的党代表。这会产生一种不当诱因,即不去创新而是等待上级当局的指示。

中国最大的高债务杠杆房地产公司恒大,最近在偿还债务方面遇到了困难。推动经济复苏的房地产市场陷入混乱。当局一直以其足够的灵活应对危机,但他们正在失去灵活性。举例来说,一家国有企业国药控股生产的疫苗,已大量出口到世界各地,但其性能不及其他广泛销售的疫苗。因此国药控股不会为中国赢得任何朋友。

为了在2022年获胜,习近平已经将自己变成了独裁者。他不是让党告诉他应该采取什么政策,而是他授意政策,让党遵循。国家媒体正在播放一个惊人的场景,习近平率领政治局常委,在他身后奴隶般地重复对党和对他个人忠诚的誓言。这一定是一种屈辱的经历,即使是曾经接受了习的人,也很可能对他产生反感。

换言之,他已经废除了邓小平的认同性统治遗产,把他们变成了唯唯诺诺,惟命是从的应声虫。对习近平来说,几乎没有制衡机制的余地。他很难根据不断变化的现实调整其政策,因为他靠恐惧来统治的。他的下属因为害怕激起他的愤怒,不敢告诉他现实情况已经发生变化。这种事态危及中国一党制国家的未来。

索罗斯先生是开放社会基金会(Open Society Foundations)的创始人

英文原文:

Xi’s Dictatorship Threatens the Chinese State


In his quest for personal power, he’s rejected Deng Xiaoping’s economic reform path and turned the Communist Party into an assemblage of yes-men.

By George Soros
Aug. 13, 2021 5:12 pm ET



Chinese President Xi Jinping at a ceremony marking the 100th anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party’s founding in Beijing, July 1.
PHOTO: JU PENG/XINHUA VIA ZUMA PRESS

Xi Jinping, the ruler of China, suffers from several internal inconsistencies which greatly reduce the cohesion and effectiveness of his leadership. There is a conflict between his beliefs and his actions and between his public declarations of wanting to make China a superpower and his behavior as a domestic ruler. These internal contradictions have revealed themselves in the context of the growing conflict between the U.S. and China.

At the heart of this conflict is the reality that the two nations represent systems of governance that are diametrically opposed. The U.S. stands for a democratic, open society in which the role of the government is to protect the freedom of the individual. Mr. Xi believes Mao Zedong invented a superior form of organization, which he is carrying on: a totalitarian closed society in which the individual is subordinated to the one-party state.


It is superior, in this view, because it is more disciplined, stronger and therefore bound to prevail in a contest.

Relations between China and the U.S. are rapidly deteriorating and may lead to war. Mr. Xi has made clear that he intends to take possession of Taiwan within the next decade, and he is increasing China’s military capacity accordingly.

He also faces an important domestic hurdle in 2022, when he intends to break the established system of succession to remain president for life. He feels that he needs at least another decade to concentrate the power of the one-party state and its military in his own hands. He knows that his plan has many enemies, and he wants to make sure they won’t have the ability to resist him.

It is against this background that the current turmoil in the financial markets is unfolding, catching many people unaware and leaving them confused. The confusion has compounded the turmoil.

Although I am no longer engaged in the financial markets, I used to be an active participant. I have also been actively engaged in China since 1984, when I introduced Communist Party reformers in China to their counterparts in my native Hungary. They learned a lot from each other, and I followed up by setting up foundations in both countries. That was the beginning of my career in what I call political philanthropy. My foundation in China was unique in being granted near-total independence. I closed it in 1989, after I learned it had come under the control of the Chinese government and just before the Tiananmen Square massacre. I resumed my active involvement in China in 2013 when Mr. Xi became the ruler, but this time as an outspoken opponent of what has since become a totalitarian regime.

I consider Mr. Xi the most dangerous enemy of open societies in the world. The Chinese people as a whole are among his victims, but domestic political opponents and religious and ethnic minorities suffer from his persecution much more. I find it particularly disturbing that so many Chinese people seem to find his social-credit surveillance system not only tolerable but attractive. It provides them social services free of charge and tells them how to stay out of trouble by not saying anything critical of Mr. Xi or his regime. If he could perfect the social-credit system and assure a steadily rising standard of living, his regime would become much more secure. But he is bound to run into difficulties on both counts.


To understand why, some historical background is necessary. Mr. Xi came to power in 2013, but he was the beneficiary of the bold reform agenda of his predecessor Deng Xiaoping, who had a very different concept of China’s place in the world. Deng realized that the West was much more developed and China had much to learn from it. Far from being diametrically opposed to the Western-dominated global system, Deng wanted China to rise within it. His approach worked wonders. China was accepted as a member of the World Trade Organization in 2001 with the privileges that come with the status of a less-developed country. China embarked on a period of unprecedented growth. It even dealt with the global financial crisis of 2007-08 better than the developed world.

Mr. Xi failed to understand how Deng achieved his success. He took it as a given and exploited it, but he harbored an intense personal resentment against Deng. He held Deng Xiaoping responsible for not honoring his father, Xi Zhongxun, and for removing the elder Xi from the Politburo in 1962. As a result, Xi Jinping grew up in the countryside in very difficult circumstances. He didn’t receive a proper education, never went abroad, and never learned a foreign language.

Xi Jinping devoted his life to undoing Deng’s influence on the development of China. His personal animosity toward Deng has played a large part in this, but other factors are equally important. He is intensely nationalistic and he wants China to become the dominant power in the world. He is also convinced that the Chinese Communist Party needs to be a Leninist party, willing to use its political and military power to impose its will. Xi Jinping strongly felt this was necessary to ensure that the Chinese Communist Party will be strong enough to impose the sacrifices needed to achieve his goal.

Mr. Xi realized that he needs to remain the undisputed ruler to accomplish what he considers his life’s mission. He doesn’t know how the financial markets operate, but he has a clear idea of what he has to do in 2022 to stay in power. He intends to overstep the term limits established by Deng, which governed the succession of Mr. Xi’s two predecessors, Hu Jintao and Jiang Zemin. Because many of the political class and business elite are liable to oppose Mr. Xi, he must prevent them from uniting against him. Thus, his first task is to bring to heel anyone who is rich enough to exercise independent power.

That process has been unfolding in the past year and reached a crescendo in recent weeks. It started with the sudden cancellation of a new issue by Alibaba’s Ant Group in November 2020 and the temporary disappearance of its former executive chairman, Jack Ma. Then


came the disciplinary measures taken against Didi Chuxing after it floated an issue in New York in June 2021. It culminated with the banishment of three U.S.-financed tutoring companies, which had a much greater effect on international markets than Mr. Xi expected. Chinese financial authorities have tried to reassure markets but with little success.

Mr. Xi is engaged in a systematic campaign to remove or neutralize people who have amassed a fortune. His latest victim is Sun Dawu, a billionaire pig farmer. Mr. Sun has been sentenced to 18 years in prison and persuaded to “donate” the bulk of his wealth to charity.

This campaign threatens to destroy the geese that lay the golden eggs. Mr. Xi is determined to bring the creators of wealth under the control of the one-party state. He has reintroduced a dual-management structure into large privately owned companies that had largely lapsed during the reform era of Deng. Now private and state-owned companies are being run not only by their management but also a party representative who ranks higher than the company president. This creates a perverse incentive not to innovate but to await instructions from higher authorities.

China’s largest, highly leveraged real-estate company, Evergrande, has recently run into difficulties servicing its debt. The real-estate market, which has been a driver of the economic recovery, is in disarray. The authorities have always been flexible enough to deal with any crisis, but they are losing their flexibility. To illustrate, a state-owned company produced a Covid-19 vaccine, Sinopharm, which has been widely exported all over the world, but its performance is inferior to all other widely marketed vaccines. Sinopharm won’t win any friends for China.

To prevail in 2022, Mr. Xi has turned himself into a dictator. Instead of allowing the party to tell him what policies to adopt, he dictates the policies he wants it to follow. State media is now broadcasting a stunning scene in which Mr. Xi leads the Standing Committee of the Politburo in slavishly repeating after him an oath of loyalty to the party and to him personally. This must be a humiliating experience, and it is liable to turn against Mr. Xi even those who had previously accepted him.

In other words, he has turned them into his own yes-men, abolishing the legacy of Deng’s consensual rule. With Mr. Xi there is little room for checks and balances. He will find it difficult to adjust his policies to a changing reality, because he rules by intimidation. His underlings are afraid to tell him how reality has changed for fear of triggering his anger. This dynamic endangers the future of China’s one-party state.

Mr. Soros is founder of the Open Society Foundations. Appeared in the August 14, 2021, print edition.

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